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Abstract
This paper shows that there is a close relation between corporate governance and the portfolios held by
investors. Most firms in countries with poor investor protection are controlled by large shareholders, so that
only a fraction of the shares issued by firms in these countries can be freely traded and held by portfolio
investors. We show that the prevalence of closely-held firms in most countries helps explain why these
countries exhibit a home bias in share holdings and why U.S. investors underweight foreign countries in their
portfolios. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not
controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world float portfolio differs sharply from the world
market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio
has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This
result holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm
level for Sweden confirms the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings. 2
The home bias is the least controversial stylized fact in international finance. There is now much
evidence that investors overweight domestic stocks in their common stock portfolios. Excellent data on stock
ownership is available for the U.S. for 1997. U.S. investors have roughly 91% of their stock investments in
U.S. stocks, but U.S. stocks represent only 49% of the world market portfolio. If investors are mean-variance
optimizers in a world of perfect financial markets, they should hold the world market portfolio of common
stocks. U.S. investors are not close to holding the world market portfolio of common stocks and neither are
investors in other countries. 
Many authors have attempted to explain the home bias. As reviewed in Lewis (1999) and Karolyi
and Stulz (2002), explanations proposed in the literature include barriers to international investment,
departures from purchasing power parity, information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors,
hedging of human capital or other non-traded assets, and over-optimism of domestic investors toward home
assets. This vast literature has not succeeded in providing a generally accepted explanation for the home bias.
In this paper, we show that differences in corporate governance across countries can help understand
the home bias through their impact on share ownership. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)
establish that firms outside the U.S. are typically controlled by a large resident shareholder. The large
shareholder is most often a family. In countries where controlling shareholders are economically important,
we would expect to see a large home bias in equity holdings since a large fraction of the outstanding shares
is held by resident controlling shareholders. However, less intuitively, we show that the economic importance
of controlling shareholders outside the U.S. helps explain the home bias of U.S. investors and leads non-U.S.
investors to weight U.S. stocks more in their portfolios. 
The world market portfolio used in the literature as a benchmark for estimates of the extent of the
home bias is constructed assuming that all shares issued by a corporation could potentially be held by foreign
investors. This is not correct. If a firm has a controlling shareholder who holds 51% of the firm’s shares, only
49% of the firm’s shares will be available for purchase by outside shareholders. An increase in the demand3
for a firm’s shares by small shareholders will not lead the controlling shareholder to lower his holdings to
less than 50% because in doing so he would lose the benefits from controlling the company. The controlling
shareholder is therefore only willing to sell his shares as a control block for a price significantly above the
price at which shares trade on the open market – he demands a control premium to sell. Nenova (2000) and
Dyck and Zingales (2001) show that the benefits from control are substantial in most countries. We call
portfolio investors those investors whose return from shares consists only of dividends and price
appreciation, so that the shares these investors hold yield no private benefits from control. Shares held by
investors who are controlling shareholders or who belong to a coalition of shareholders who control the firm
cannot be bought by portfolio investors and therefore should not be included in the world market portfolio
when estimating the home bias of these investors.
We construct estimates of the fraction of the shares that are closely held for 51 countries in 1997.
Our estimate can also be thought of as measuring the float of shares in each market as a fraction of the
market’s capitalization, which would be one minus the fraction of closely-held shares. We define closely-held
shares to be those held by a stockholder who would not sell without being paid a premium to reflect the
benefits he derives from control. We call such a shareholder a controlling shareholder. We classify as
controlling shareholders all shareholders who are known to hold more than 5% of a firm’s shares.  Across
the 51 countries, the average estimate is that 32% of shares are not available for trading. 
The typical country has a significant home bias explained by the concentration of ownership. To see
this, consider a country whose market represents 1% of world stock market capitalization where controlling
shareholders own 32% of the stock market capitalization. Assume further that the stock market wealth of
investors in the country is equal to the capitalization of the local stock market. If the investors in the country
had no home bias except that they hold shares to control local firms, these investors would hold more than
32% of the local stock market capitalization, which is more than 32 times what they would hold if they were
to hold the world market portfolio. 4
We show that, under some assumptions, portfolio investors hold the world market portfolio of shares
that are not closely held. Using data from 1997, we construct an estimate of this portfolio, which we refer
to as the world float portfolio. The U.S. market weight in the world float portfolio is 58.32%, in comparison
with its weight of 49.60% in the world market portfolio. This is because, relative to other countries, more
of the shares issued by U.S. corporations can be held by portfolio investors because fewer of these shares
are held by controlling shareholders. Consequently, portfolio investors should overweight the U.S. in their
holdings relative to the share of the U.S. in the world market portfolio. We estimate closely-held shares to
represent 7.94% of U.S. equities. Adding the holdings of controlling investors of U.S. corporations to the
holdings of U.S. equities portfolio investors would have if they held the world float portfolio, we find U.S.
investors would hold at least 63.07% of their equities in U.S. shares when portfolio investors do not have
a home bias. Taking into account the shares held by controlling shareholders has the effect of increasing the
share of the U.S. in the world float portfolio and, thereby, reducing (but not eliminating) the home bias of
U.S. investors as traditionally measured. 
In our empirical analysis, we show that the share of a country’s equities in the stock portfolio of U.S.
investors is negatively related to the share of the stock market capitalization of the country held by large
shareholders. The literature has established that financial markets are more developed in countries where
investors’ rights are better protected and firms are more likely to have a controlling shareholder or
shareholder group in countries where investors’ rights are less protected (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000)). Hence, it could be that U.S. investors are more reluctant to invest in countries
with poorer investor rights and that our estimate of shares held by controlling shareholders serves as a proxy
for investor rights. We investigate this issue in multiple regressions and find that differences in investor
rights and financial development across countries cannot explain why U.S. investors invest less in countries
where large shareholders own a larger fraction of the market’s capitalization when we control for the world
float portfolio. This is not surprising since differences in investor rights and financial development should5
be capitalized in share prices so that investing in stocks will be a fair investment in a country regardless of
that country’s protection of investor rights and its financial development. 
If we are right that ownership concentration can help explain the extent of the home bias, we should
find that controlling shareholders are mostly local investors and that foreign investors invest more in firms
that are less closely held.  Sweden has data on the identity of controlling shareholders, on the fractions of
shares that are closely held, and on the fraction of shares held by foreign investors. We find that instances
where foreign investors belong to the controlling coalition are rare and that a firm’s weight in the float
portfolio is an important determinant of foreign ownership. Surprisingly, we also find that foreign investors
as a whole are closer to holding the Swedish float portfolio than U.S. investors. Finally, the difference
between the fraction of voting rights held by the controlling coalition and the fraction of cash flow rights held
by the same coalition, which is often viewed as a measure of agency costs, does not seem to be an important
determinant of the ownership of Swedish shares by foreign investors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we review the literature on the relation between
ownership concentration and investor rights, and then discuss the conditions under which it is optimal for
investors to hold the world float portfolio. We then estimate in Section II the fraction of shares held by large
shareholders for 51 countries. In Section III, we compare the world market portfolio to the world float
portfolio. In Section IV, we show that the fraction of shares held by U.S. investors in 50 foreign countries
is negatively related to the proportion of shares held by controlling shareholders. We further show that the
world float portfolio explains the stock holdings of U.S. investors better than the world market portfolio. In
Section V, we examine foreign ownership at the firm level in Sweden. Section VI concludes and discusses
some additional implications of our results.
I. Investor protection, corporate governance, and foreign investors. 
We first review the relation between investor protection and corporate governance. We then discuss1See Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) for examples. 
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the conditions under which portfolio investors hold the float portfolio. 
 
I.A. Investor protection and corporate governance. 
If the rights of minority shareholders in firms are poorly protected, those who control the firms can
more easily use its resources to pursue their own objectives. The literature on the agency costs of managerial
discretion focuses on how management can make decisions that are not in the interest of shareholders but
instead improve management’s welfare. This literature often emphasizes that management values firm size
more than it would if it were maximizing shareholder wealth. In many countries, those in control of firms
are not simply making investment choices that shareholders would prefer they did not make. Instead, they
can  remove corporate assets from the firm in a variety of ways. For instance, they can sell corporate assets
at below-market prices to corporations they control or can issue securities at below-market prices.
1
If the rights of investors are so poorly protected that those in control of firms have the ability to
expropriate assets, firms may find it too expensive to raise funds unless those in control can commit to
limiting expropriation. When those in control of a firm have a large stake in the firm’s cash flows,
expropriation is expensive for them when it involves deadweight costs since they end up paying a large
fraction of these deadweight costs. Consequently, having a controlling shareholder with a large cash flow
stake is one solution whereby firms can become public and raise public equity. 
Shleifer and Wolfenson (2002) build a model where an entrepreneur who sets up a firm has some
chance of getting caught and being fined if he expropriates minority shareholders. The probability of getting
caught is higher in countries with better shareholder protection. In their model, better investor protection
leads to greater recourse to external finance by firms. This corresponds to a negative relation between cash
flow rights of controlling shareholders and investor protection. Alternative specifications of the cost of
diverting cash flow from the minority shareholders lead to similar results (see La Porta et al. (2002) and2 See Karolyi and Stulz (2002) for a review of how inflation and exchange rate uncertainty affect
portfolio choice in open economies. Models that focus on barriers to international investment usually ignore
inflation and exchange rate uncertainty like we do. The model we present is unchanged in the presence of
inflation and exchange rate uncertainty provided that returns are real returns, that purchasing power parity
holds, and that there is an asset that has a risk-free real return.
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Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998)). 
Empirical evidence shows that concentrated ownership is prevalent in countries with poor investor
protection. La Porta et al. (1999) show that atomistic ownership is prevalent mostly in the U.S. and in the
U.K., which are the countries with the best investor protection. La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al.
(2002) provide indirect evidence in support of theories that emphasize a positive relation between the extent
to which minority shareholders can be expropriated and ownership concentration. They show that there is
a stronger relation between ownership of cash flow rights and Tobin’s q in countries with poorer shareholder
protection. 
It must be noted that diffuse ownership is not necessarily the outcome of good investor protection.
First, as Roe (2002) points out, ownership is concentrated in countries with good corporate law. Second,
Cheffins (2002) argues that there is no compelling empirical evidence showing that diffuse ownership is
associated with greater performance. Third, even if investor rights are somehow perfectly enforced,
information asymmetries can still make it optimal for entrepreneurs to retain a large investment in their firm
as shown by Leland and Pyle (1977).  Finally, Martin and Rey (2001) develop a model where entrepreneurs
face downward-sloping demand curves for their firms’ shares because of the size of the market where they
can float the shares. Their model shows that entrepreneurs in smaller countries will retain a bigger stake,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
I.B. International diversification in the presence of large shareholders.
Consider first a world with perfect financial markets, so that there are no barriers to international
investment. For simplicity, there is no inflation and no exchange rate uncertainty.
2 Assume further that all8
investors are mean-variance investors with identical information about the distribution of returns – investors
who form their portfolios by trading off expected return against variance of return. If the investments
available to investors are common stocks and the risk-free asset, all investors invest in the world market
portfolio of common stocks, which we denote by the superscript M,  and in the risk-free asset. The portfolio
weight of a firm’s common stock in that portfolio,  , is defined as the total capitalization of the equity
M
pq w
of firm q in country p (which we call firm pq) divided by the total capitalization of the equity of all firms in
the world.
The result that each investor holds the world market portfolio of common stocks depends crucially
on the assumption that each investor trades off expected return against variance of return taking the value
of firms as given when forming his portfolio. A controlling shareholder does not form his portfolio this way.
By controlling a firm, such a shareholder affects the value of that firm and the value of the private benefits
he receives from that firm. Suppose that firm pq has a controlling shareholder and that this shareholder owns
a fraction *pq of the outstanding shares of that firm. He is not willing to reduce his stake in the firm because
doing so would put his control of the firm at risk.
In a world with controlling investors, expected returns will be such that portfolio investors hold the
shares not held by controlling investors. With mean-variance portfolio investors, these investors still hold
the same portfolio of common stocks, but it is no longer the world market portfolio. Instead, they hold the
world portfolio of shares not held by controlling shareholders. The composition of this portfolio depends on
the holdings of controlling shareholders. Suppose that controlling shareholders can perfectly hedge the risk
of their controlling stake. In this case, each investor would hold the risk of the world market portfolio of
common stocks. However, portfolio investors would be counterparties to the hedges of controlling investors,
so that if the controlling investor of firm pq hedges his holdings with a total return swap, then the portfolio
investors would end up bearing the risk associated with the long equity position in firm q in country p of that9
total return swap. Because of counterparty risks and credit constraints, it seems unreasonable to believe that
controlling investors will be able to hedge their holdings effectively through short sales, swaps, or costless
collars. For instance, with a total return swap, the counterparties to the controlling shareholder would want
to reduce their counterparty risk. A mark-to-market swap would require the controlling shareholder to put
up large amounts of cash if the value of his control block increases. As long as his control block is most of
his wealth, he will not be able to do so without selling shares, hence breaking up his control block.
Consequently, a controlling shareholder who is concerned about maintaining his control block would not
enter such a hedge. In addition, however, the controlling shareholder would have to make payments on the
swap for which he might not have cash available if the dividend-yield on his control block is low and if most
of his wealth is invested in the stock. The counterparty risk argument also applies for short sales and costless
collars. 
If the controlling shareholder does not hedge and has no other equity investments, then the total
investment in firm pq of investors who are not controlling shareholders, whom we call portfolio investors,
has to be , where M is the market capitalization of all the shares of common stock in the world.
M
pq pq (1-δ )w M
Denote by  the portfolio weight of the common stock of firm pq in the portfolio of  common
ki
pq w
stocks of investor i in country k. The  fraction of the investor’s portfolio invested in firm pq relative to the
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The portfolio weight of stock pq falls relative to the portfolio weight of stock kj as the fraction of the shares10
of firm pq held by the controlling shareholder increases. If controlling shareholders hold different proportions
of stocks pq and kj, portfolio investors cannot hold the world market portfolio. In particular, if stocks pq and
kj have the same weights in the world market portfolio, but the controlling shareholder of firm pq holds more
than the controlling shareholder of kj, the weight of stock pq in the portfolio of portfolio investors has to be
less than the weight of stock kj.
We can also express holdings of firm pq as a fraction of the portfolio of risky assets of an investor
relative to what the holdings would be without closely held shares. The weight of firm pq in the portfolio of














The numerator on the right-hand side is the fraction of the stock pq not held by controlling shareholders. The
denominator of the right-hand side of this expression corresponds to the fraction of a dollar of the world
market portfolio that can be held by portfolio investors. In the traditional CAPM, this fraction is one, and
since there are no controlling shareholders, the numerator is one also. Therefore, with the CAPM
assumptions, each investor’s portfolio of risky assets is the world market portfolio. The right-hand side of
equation (2) exceeds one when a firm’s controlling shareholders own a smaller fraction of the firm’s stock
than the fraction of the world stock market wealth held by controlling shareholders, and will be smaller than
one otherwise.
The existing literature on the home bias has analyzed how departures from mean-variance
optimization can help explain the home bias. Departures from mean-variance optimization would affect the
holdings of portfolio investors in our model, but they would not change the two key points we make, namely
that the existence of controlling shareholders implies that there is an inherent home bias in how investors in3 As Ahearne, Griver, and Warnock (2001) point out “Differences between the two sources were for
the most part small or nonexistent, except in the data for Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand, where the IFC
number was based on an incorrect currency conversion.”  We use the FIBV number for Ireland.
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a country invest their wealth and that the existence of controlling shareholders increases the portfolio shares
of countries with dispersed firm ownership for portfolio investors.  
II. Controlling shareholders and the world market portfolio.
Our sample of U.S. investor holdings of foreign securities is taken from the 2000 version of the
Report on U.S. Holdings of Foreign Long-term Investments published by United States Department of
Treasury.  The report examines foreign equity holdings in 164 countries by U.S. investors as of the end of
1997. The equity holdings are obtained from a survey by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve
Board of major custodians and large institutional investors. Participation in the survey is mandatory and lack
of compliance is subject to penalties. The primary source for the world market portfolio is the 1998
Emerging Markets Fact Book of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). We also use the data reported
by the Fédération Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV), the World Bank, and the Salomon Guide
to World Equities of 1999. All sources report market capitalizations as of the end of 1997. For most
countries, the numbers provided by these various sources are very similar. However, there are some countries
with large differences – Ireland has a capitalization of $24 billion according to IFC but $49 billion according
to FIBV.
3 Our conclusions are not sensitive to these differences. 
We define country k’s weight in the world market portfolio,  , as the ratio of the market
M
k w
capitalization of country k divided by the market capitalization of all equity markets in the world as reported
by the IFC.  To obtain the fraction of a firm’s shares that are closely held,  , we use the data on closely
kj δ
held shares from the Worldscope Database.  Closely-held shares correspond to shares held by insiders.4 This particular example does not affect our results because our data come from 1997.  The example
is merely illustrative of possible biases.
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Insiders are considered to be officers, directors, and their immediate families, shares held in trusts, shares
held by another corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by financial institutions), shares held
by pension benefit plans, and shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. For
Japanese firms, closely held shares represent the holdings of the ten largest shareholders.
The first column of Table 1 shows the number of firms in each country for which Worldscope has
any information for 1997. Worldscope typically has information on large firms in a country. Not surprisingly,
the number of firms in the dataset varies dramatically across countries, with 2 firms in Slovakia and 2,409
firms in Japan. Among the firms for which Worldscope has information, it has ownership information for
only a subset of firms. The second column in the table reports the number of firms in each country for which
ownership data are available. In some countries, the number of firms for which ownership data are available
is close to the number of firms in the Worldscope dataset. In other countries, only a small fraction of firms
have ownership information. For instance, Worldscope has ownership data on 2,392 of 2,409 Japanese firms,
but only 15 of 166 firms in Taiwan. 
Our estimate of the fraction  has some potential biases. One upward bias arises because the
kj δ
measure includes large holdings by shareholders who may not be part of the controlling coalition. For
instance, when T. Boone Pickens attempted to acquire a board seat at Koito Manufacturing in the 1980s, he
owned 26% of that company. With our approach, this stake would be part of the closely held shares of the
company, so that we would overstate the ownership of the controlling coalition for that company.
4 Another
upward bias exists only for the firms with ADR programs. For firms with large ADR programs, a U.S. bank
holds shares in the firm. That stake can be large enough that the bank could be counted as a large
shareholder. Worldscope in principle does not count that among the stakes held by large shareholders.5 We thank Frank Warnock for alerting us to this problem. 
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However, it is clear that there are cases with ADR programs where the shareholders with stakes exceeding
5% reported by Worldscope include the U.S. bank that issued the ADRs.
5
The first downward bias occurs if part of the stake of a controlling shareholder is held through third
parties, such as other corporations, that own small stakes in the firm. We might miss these stakes altogether.
For instance, a company with a controlling shareholder who exerts control through fifteen stakes of 4%
would appear to have no controlling shareholder with our data.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999) show both that indirect ownership is important and that finding the ultimate owner of a corporation
is difficult. However, their analysis would also miss a controlling shareholder who exerts control through
fifteen stakes of 4%. The second downward bias occurs because of poor reporting. Importantly, disclosure
requirements vary across countries and the disclosure requirements are not consistently enforced.
Worldscope cannot report undisclosed holdings. This may lead us to especially understate the fraction of
closely held shares in countries with poor disclosure requirements. The third occurs because Worldscope
reports data only for the largest companies in a country. Controlling shareholders are even more prevalent
in the smaller companies. This third bias may not be important because the market portfolio for a country
is value-weighted. 
In the discussion of Section I, we ignored barriers to international investment. Such barriers exist
and they contribute to the home bias. In particular, in many countries, some shares cannot be held by foreign
investors. We use a market portfolio for each country that ignores the ownership restrictions against foreign
investors. The reason for proceeding this way is that we cannot distinguish within the controlling block
which shares have ownership restrictions and which do not. Consequently, what we call the portfolio of
available shares may include some shares that are not available to foreign investors.
To aggregate the firm level data to the country level, we estimate the percentage of shares closely
held in a country by forming a value-weighted average of controlling stakes for the firms for which14
Worldscope reports the data. The value-weighted estimate divides the sum of the market value of all closely
held shares in a country by the sum of the market value of all shares. Define Mkj to be the market value of
the equity of firm kj. With this notation, our estimate of the fraction of shares held by controlling













We construct this index for each country using only the firms with available data on closely held shares in
that country.  Data on closely-held shares are available for 51 countries. The third column of Table 1 reports
our estimate of the fraction of closely-held shares for country k. Worldscope reports firm data for the end
of a firm’s fiscal year. Different firms in a country can have different fiscal years, so that the market values
using Worldscope can be measured at different points in time. We therefore compute the fraction of closely-
held shares using end of December stock prices. The difficulty with this approach is that while all the stock
prices are from December 1997, we are using the number of shares outstanding measured at different month
ends.  We also compute the fraction of closely-held shares using end of fiscal year data. The two approaches
lead to estimates of the fraction of closely-held shares that are virtually identical. Except for three countries,
the two approaches lead to estimates that are within one percent of the country’s market capitalization.
Table 1 shows that the U.S. is unique among the countries for which we have data. For the U.S., the
fraction of shares that are closely held is 7.94%, which makes the U.S. the country with the lowest value-
weighted controlling ownership. The U.K. is next with 9.93%. Except for Ireland, Sri Lanka, the U.S., and
the U.K., no country has a value-weighted controlling ownership of less than 20%. Only seven countries have
value-weighted controlling ownership between 20% and 30%. Twenty-three countries have value-weighted
controlling ownership in excess of 50%. 15
The last three columns show the market value of the firms for which we have information about
closely-held shares, the market value of the country’s firms, and the percentage of the market capitalization
of the country represented by the firms for which we have information about closely-held shares. For 19
countries, we have information on closely-held shares for more than 80% of the market’s capitalization. For
some countries, the value of the firms for which we have information on closely-held shares exceeds the
reported value of the market capitalization. This could arise for a number of different reasons. First, in some
cases, the market capitalization of IFC is low compared to the estimate of FIBV. Second, shares could have
been issued since the end of the fiscal year. Third, firms have different classes of shares, so that estimates
of firm market values could differ because of differences in ways of treating different classes of shares.
Fourth, some firms could be traded only on regional exchanges that may not be included in the IFC or FIBV
estimates. Fifth, some closely-held shares might be non-traded shares. According to the last column of Table
1, however, for many countries the market capitalization of the firms for which we have closely-held shares
information is close to the market capitalization of all firms. We do not use the percentage in the last column
in our analyses.  The number we use is the percentage of closely-held shares and that number varies little for
an individual country if we compute it at either fiscal year end or calendar year end. Consequently, we are
reassured that the percentage of closely-held shares is not sensitive to timing. 
Section III. The home bias after taking into account closely-held shares. 
In this section, we show that taking into account that some shares are not available for stock market
trading reduces the extent of the home bias significantly for the U.S. and dramatically for most other
countries. In the first column of Table 2, we report the weight of each country in the U.S. investors’ portfolio.
These weights overstate the extent of the home bias by U.S. investors, in that U.S. controlling shareholders
cannot sell their shares to diversify internationally. To compute the home bias of U.S. investors, it is
therefore necessary to compute the bias relative to shares U.S. investors hold that are available for stock6 Since the U.S. stock market capitalization is $11,308,779 million in 1997 and the Treasury
Department reports for the same year that foreign investors held $929,000 million in U.S. equities, holdings
of U.S. equities by U.S. investors must therefore have been $10,379,779 million. The Treasury Department
also reports that U.S. investors own $1,207,787 million of foreign equities. Thus, U.S. investors hold equities
for $11,587,566 million. Our estimate using Worldscope data is that 7.94% of U.S. market capitalization
represents closely-held shares. Assuming that U.S. controlling shareholders hold closely only U.S. shares,
U.S. portfolio investors hold $10,689,649 million in equities. 
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market trading. While U.S. investors held $11,587,566 million in equities in 1997, of which $1,207,787
million were foreign equities, closely-held shares represented 7.94% of the U.S. stock market capitalization,
which was $11,308,779 million according to IFC. Consequently, portfolio investors held $10,689,649 in
equities.
6 To assess the home bias of portfolio investors, portfolio weights of foreign stock holdings have to
use a denominator of $10,689,649 million rather than $11,587,566 million. Assuming that none of the foreign
equities were closely held, portfolio investors owned 11.30% of their stock wealth in foreign stocks. The
second column of Table 2 computes the portfolio proportions of portfolio investors this way. The portfolio
weights of foreign countries are increased uniformly to reflect the fact that the same dollar amount – holdings
by U.S. investors in a country – is now divided by a smaller denominator – U.S. holdings of shares that are
not closely held. 
The third column shows the world market portfolio weight for each country in our dataset. The
portfolio weights range from 0.01% for Zimbabwe to 49.60% for the U.S. Out of the 51 countries, 43
countries have a world portfolio share below 2%. Only the U.S. has a portfolio share greater than 10%. 
The fourth column of Table 2 shows the float portfolio weight of each country. For each country,
the available shares of firm kj represents a fraction  of the world market portfolio. Since these
M
kj kj (1 )w δ −
weights  do not sum to one, we divide each weight by the sum of the weights to get portfolio weights that
sum to one. After making this adjustment and summing the available shares across a country, we get the




















The denominator on the right-hand side of the equation is the fraction of available shares in the world market
portfolio. The numerator is the fraction of available shares in country k’s market portfolio. Consequently,
a country will have a larger weight in the world float portfolio only if the fraction of shares available for
trading in that country is greater than the fraction of shares available for trading in the world market
portfolio. The only countries with greater weights in the world float portfolio than in the world market
portfolio are Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. The weight of the U.S. in the world float
portfolio is 58.32%, in contrast to 49.60% in the world market portfolio.  For a number of countries, the drop
in the portfolio weight is large in proportion to the weight of the country in the world market portfolio. An
example is Brazil which falls from 1.12% to 0.47%. The weight of Brazil in the portfolio of equities held by
U.S. investors is 0.24%. Though the share of Brazil in the portfolio of U.S. investors is 21% of Brazil’s
weight in the world market portfolio, it is 51% of Brazil’s weight in the world float portfolio. This effect
takes place across countries, but obviously its importance depends on the extent to which shares are closely
held in a country. 
Traditionally, the home bias has been measured using the world market portfolio as a benchmark and
assuming that all shares held by investors in a country could be freely traded. A measure of the bias is the
percentage by which investors overweight their home country relative to the world market portfolio weight.
With this measure, the home bias of U.S. investors is (0.913 – 0.496)/0.496, or 84%. The fifth column of
Table 2 shows the home bias of U.S. investors against each country measured as the difference of a country’s
weight in the portfolio of U.S. investors and the world market portfolio weight of that country expressed as7 Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2001) measure the home bias this way, but they multiply it by
minus one.  
8 Unfortunately, except for Doidge (2001), the residence of controlling investors has not been
investigated in the literature. Doidge (2001) provides evidence that in a sample of firms that have ADRs,
almost all firms have resident controlling shareholders. We show in Section V that this is the case for
Sweden. 
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a fraction of the country’s weight in the world market portfolio.
7  
There are two problems with the traditional calculation for the U.S.: it assumes all shares in the U.S.
can be freely traded and it assumes all foreign shares can be freely traded also. Neither assumption is correct
because there are closely held shares in each country. Investors cannot hold the world market portfolio as
long as most firms outside the U.S. are controlled by large shareholders. Further, if U.S. investors could hold
the world market portfolio, they would not do so because doing so would force controlling shareholders in
the U.S. to liquidate their control blocks. The shares that U.S. investors can invest freely are the shares they
own that are not closely held. We saw that with this computation, U.S. portfolio investors put 11.3% of their
common stock wealth available for stock market trading in foreign stocks. We can compute the home bias
of U.S. portfolio investors using our bias measure. It is (0.887 – 0.5832)/0.5832, or 52%. Therefore, using
a measure of tradeable shares only, the home bias falls by 38%. The last column of Table 2 shows the home
bias computed this way. 
We do not have the data to compute the home bias in foreign countries. To do that, we would need
to know the stock market wealth of a country as well as the value of foreign stocks held by the residents of
that country. However, we can show that ownership concentration leads to a large home bias even if portfolio
investors have no home bias.  To show this, we assume that controlling shareholders are domestic
shareholders, which is generally the case.
8  Consider then a country that is 1% of the world market portfolio
where controlling shareholders hold 50% of the market capitalization. In this country, local shareholders hold
more than 50% of the market capitalization, even when portfolio investors do not have a home bias in that
country. Suppose that stock market wealth in that country is equal to the stock market capitalization, that19
local portfolio investors do not have a home bias, and that the country represents 0.5% of the world float
portfolio. In this case, 50.25% of domestic stock market wealth is invested in the local market portfolio.
Using the world market portfolio, the home bias is (0.5025 – 0.01)/0.01, or 4,925%. In contrast, using the
world float portfolio taking into account the fact that controlling shareholders are local investors, there is no
home bias with our assumptions. In other words, our approach can explain a home bias where the portfolio
weight of local stocks of local investors is ten times or more larger what it should be in the absence of
controlling investors. 
Section IV. The determinants of country portfolio shares in the portfolio of stocks of U.S. investors.
In this section, we use multiple regressions to examine the determinants of a country’s portfolio share
in the portfolio of stocks of U.S. investors. In all the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4, the dependent
variable is the portfolio share of a country for U.S. investors. The U.S. is not included in the sample since
the portfolio share of the U.S. is one minus the sum of the portfolio shares of the other countries. 
The first column of Panel A of Table 3 shows that the portfolio share of a country for U.S. investors
is positively related to the weight of that country in the world market portfolio. Absent a home bias and
absent closely-held shares, the coefficient on the world market portfolio weight of a country should be one.
Instead, the coefficient is 0.1496 with a t-statistic of 5.59. When we use the weight of a country in the world
float portfolio, the coefficient is 0.1610 and the t-statistic is 14.68. The adjusted R-square of the regression
increases from 0.8416 to 0.8816 when we substitute the weight of the float portfolio for the weight of the
market portfolio. In the third column, we report a regression with both weights. The weight of a country in
the world market portfolio is not significant in that regression. Finally, in the last column, we include in the
regression the weight of a country in the world market portfolio and the fraction of shares closely held in that
country. The fraction of shares closely held has a significant negative coefficient, so that U.S. investors have
a lower portfolio share of countries with a larger fraction of shares that are closely held. All these results are9 The orthogonalization is done by using the residual of a first pass regression of the float portfolio
market share on the world market portfolio share.
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consistent with the model of Section I. However, taking into account the fraction of shares that are closely
held does not make the home bias disappear since the coefficient on the float portfolio share is not one. 
In the second panel of Table 3, we examine whether there is information in the country weights of
the world float portfolio that is not in the country weights of the world market portfolio. For that purpose,
we use an orthogonalization procedure. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the country weight in the
world market portfolio and a variable which corresponds to the information in the country’s weight in the
world float portfolio that is not also in the country’s weight in the world market portfolio.
9 It is clear from
the regression that the weight in the world float portfolio has information that is not in the weight of the
world market portfolio. We then reverse the procedure to show that the weights of the market portfolio have
no information for understanding the country portfolio shares of U.S. investors that the weights of the float
portfolio do not have.
We find that the fraction of closely-held shares helps explain the portfolio shares of countries in the
stock portfolio of U.S. investors. It could be, however, that the float portfolio better explains the country
portfolio shares of U.S. investors than the market portfolio simply because the fraction of closely-held shares
proxies for country characteristics that explain the country weights in the portfolio. In that case, controlling
for country characteristics would remove the explanatory power of the world float portfolio in a regression
that also includes the world market portfolio.
In Table 4, we take the regression of Panel A of Table 3 that regresses the portfolio share of a
country in the portfolio of stocks of U.S. investors on the world market portfolio weight and the world float
portfolio weight of a country and show that our results are robust to controlling for country characteristics.
If investors were to hold the world market portfolio, the only country characteristic that would matter for
their portfolio would be the share of the country in the world market portfolio. However, since we show that21
the fraction of shares held by controlling shareholders is significantly related to the weight of a country in
the portfolio of U.S. investors, we have to be concerned that the fraction of shares held by controlling
shareholders proxies for country characteristics correlated with the fraction of shares held by controlling
shareholders. As discussed earlier, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) predict that ownership is more
concentrated when investor protection is weaker. Greater investor protection leads to greater financial
development. Consequently, we examine whether controlling for measures of investor protection and
financial development affects our conclusions. 
In all regressions of Table 4, we control for GNP per capita to take into account the correlation
between the other variables and economic development. GNP per capita is significant at the 10% level in
only one regression. In the first regression, we control for the La Porta et al. (1998) anti-director index. A
higher value of the index means greater minority shareholder protection.  We then control for measures of
judicial efficiency, corruption, and expropriation risk. These indices are those used by La Porta et al. (1998).
The indices are constructed so that a value of one means low investor protection and a value of 10 means
high investor protection. Countries with greater expropriation risk have a lower share in the portfolios of U.S.
investors. We control for the stock market capitalization per capita and for equity issues to GDP. These two
measures are computed for 1997 and are obtained from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (1999). These
measures are unrelated to the share of a country in U.S. stock portfolios.We control for trade openness,
defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP from 1985 to 1995, obtained from Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (1999). It is not significant. Finally, we estimate whether enforcement of insider
trading laws (as reported by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)) affects ownership by U.S. investors. We find
that U.S. equity holders invest more in countries that enforce insider-trading laws; this effect is significant
at the 5% level. When we use all these variables in a regression, they increase the adjusted R
2 by 3%. The
corruption index is the only significant variable besides the weight in the world float portfolio. The weight
in the world float portfolio is highly significant in all the regressions of Table 4, while the weight in the22
world market portfolio is never significant. Adding the country control variables to the regressions of Table
3 affects none of our conclusions. The bottom line is that the indices of good government do not matter for
the investment of U.S. investors. In other words, for a given supply of shares, U.S. investors do not invest
less in a country because minority shareholders are less well protected or because laws are not enforced. If
a country has bad government, it has lower stock prices, but stocks are priced so that investors can expect
a fair return.  
Though we do not reproduce the results, we estimate the regressions of Tables 3 and  4 imposing the
requirement that a country has to have at least 5, 10, or 20 firms to be included in the regression. Our
conclusions are not affected by this requirement. We also estimate the regressions of Tables 3 and 4 using
only countries for which we have ownership data for at least 75% of the country’s market capitalization. This
requirement reduces the number of countries, but none of the conclusions we reach are affected when we
impose this requirement.  
We also estimate the regressions of Tables 3 and 4 using weighted least squares regressions. The idea
is that we estimate the fraction of market capitalization that is closely-held more precisely in some countries
than in others. When we weight more countries where this fraction is higher. our results become stronger.
V. A firm-level examination for Sweden. 
In the empirical analysis of Sections III and IV, we construct a world float portfolio using data
reported by Worldscope. For the countries used in our analysis, we do not have available the fraction of
shares of each firm held by foreign investors. The ownership data we are able to use consistently across
countries is the value-weighted share of each country in the portfolio of U.S. investors. Foreign ownership
is available at the firm level for some countries, however. Our model predicts a negative relation between
foreign ownership and closely-held ownership as long as controlling shareholders are domestic investors.
In the case of Sweden, both foreign ownership and closely-held share ownership are available. This makes10 Giannetti and Simonov (2002) explore the impact of governance on whether shares of a firm will
be in the portfolio of foreign investors using a probit model. They find that a foreign investor is less likely
to have shares of firms where minority shareholders are more at risk of expropriation in their portfolios. Our
model has predictions on the share of firms in the portfolio of investors, but not on whether shares of a
particular firm will be in the portfolio of a particular investor. 
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it possible for us to investigate the relation between foreign ownership and closely-held share ownership at
the firm level. The Swedish data allow us to check whether foreign investors are controlling shareholders.
There are some additional benefits from an analysis using the Swedish data. First, we are able to use
a much better data source than Worldscope since we have all Swedish firms in our sample and have
information on the nationality of controlling investors. Second, we have data on the ownership by U.S.
investors in Swedish firms as well as by all foreign investors, so that we can compare the float as a
determinant of holdings for U.S. and foreign investors. Third, we can examine whether there is a negative
relation between foreign ownership and closely-held share ownership keeping investor protection unchanged.
Fourth, we can investigate whether the quality of governance, proxied by departures from one share – one
vote, matter for foreign ownership.
10  
As shown in Table 2, Sweden's weight in U.S. investors' portfolio in 1997 was about 0.3%, whereas
Sweden's weight in the world market portfolio was about 1.2%. There are no restrictions to ownership of
Swedish shares by foreign investors. The determinants of the foreign holdings of Swedish shares are
examined by Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) who find that foreign investors prefer large, financially solid,
and well-known firms. Kang and Stulz (1997) find similar results for Japan and argue that this ownership
pattern can emerge if non-resident investors know more about large firms than small firms in the market in
which they invest. The prediction from our model is that the share of a firm in the portfolio of foreign
investors is inversely related to the fraction of the shares of that firm that are held by its controlling
shareholders. Since typically more shares are closely held in smaller firms, it is possible that the greater
weighting of small firms in the world market portfolio than in the world float portfolio can help explain why
foreign investors are more likely to invest in large firms.11 A firm can have some shares that are not listed. The non-listed shares typically have more voting
rights than the listed shares, but obviously they are less liquid. In our sample, 99 firms have non-listed shares.
We compute the market value of a firm’s equity by adding the value of all shares issued by that firm. To
estimate the value of the non-listed shares, we assume that non-listed shares trade at the same price as listed
shares with same cash flow rights but lower voting rights. The firms with non-listed shares are generally the
smaller firms. Our results are not sensitive to how we estimate the value of non-listed shares in computing
the market capitalization of a firm, in the sense that the results are the same if we assume that non-listed
shares are worthless.  
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V. A. Data.
We consider data on individual firms for the year of 1997. The market capitalization of a firm is the
total number of shares outstanding times the price of each share at the year-end.
11 The data are collected from
Stockholm Information Exchange (SIX). Stockholders of all listed firms in Sweden are registered at
Värdepaperscentralen (the Swedish Security Register Centre). SIS Ägarservice identifies from these data
actual owners in all firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In particular, SIS Ägarservice has
provided us with data of holdings by foreign investors (see Sundin and Sundqvist (1998)). We are also able
to break up foreign holdings into holdings by U.S. and other countries’ investors. For a detailed description
of the data and foreign ownership in Sweden, see Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001). In our sample, there are
30 firms that are listed on multiple exchanges. We consider a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the firm’s shares are listed abroad. Otherwise the value is zero. The data source is the Stockholm Stock
Exchange.
We also collect data on control. We compute cash flow and voting rights of controlling shareholders.
The original data come from SIS Ägarservice and corporations’ own company charts or web pages, and were
initially collected by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2001) who study agency costs of controlling minority
shareholders. Based on these data, we construct two measures of closely-held shares for each firm; the
narrow measure is the fraction of the market capitalization of a firm held by the largest shareholder coalition;
the broad measure is the fraction of the market capitalization held by all shareholder coalitions. By definition,
the narrow measure is always less than or equal to the broad measure. We also consider the corresponding12 The SEK/USD exchange rate was at the end of 1997 about 8.
25
measures of voting rights. To be included in the measures of controlling shareholders, an investor has to own
more than 5% of the voting rights. The broad measure corresponds to the measure used earlier in the paper.
The narrow measure has the advantage that it captures those shareholders most likely to derive private
benefits from control. By subtracting our measures of closely-held shares from the market capitalization, we
effectively have two measures of the (local) market float portfolio. That is, the portfolio that accounts for
closely-held shares and is available to a foreign investor.
These data differ from the Worldscope data, but there are 162 overlapping firms in the two datasets.
The levels of closely-held shares are similar using our broad measure and the Worldscope data. The
correlations between our narrow and broad measures with the Worldscope data of closely-held shares are
74% and 87%. 
V.B. Controlling shareholders. 
We have 228 firms with complete data on foreign ownership and closely-held shares. The total
market capitalization of these firms is about $249 billion, which is 93% of the total market capitalization at
the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1997.
12 In 1997, U.S. and foreign investors held 15.9% and 32.7% of total
market equity. The corresponding equally weighted averages are lower, 6.3% and 20.4%, that is, foreign and
U.S. investors tend to underweight smaller firms. About 18.3% of total market capitalization is held by the
largest shareholder coalition of each firm, and about 28.5% is held by all shareholder coalitions. Closely-held
shares are more common in smaller firms as indicated by the equally weighted averages of 28.4% and 41.2%
for our narrow and broad measures, respectively.
In Section III, we noticed that in almost half of our sample countries’ closely-held shares represent
more than half of the shares (see also Table 1). Though Sweden has among the lowest fraction of market
capitalization closely held, there is also a wide dispersion across firms. There are 77 firms (or 34% of our26
sample) where more than 50% of the shares are closely held. 
An important issue we ignored in our earlier analysis is that a group of shareholders can exert control
without owning a claim to half of the firm’s cash flows. When that does happen, foreign investors have
access to ownership of a greater fraction of the firm’s cash flows, but the agency costs of controlling
shareholders may be exacerbated. Nenova (2000) uses the differential voting rights of shares to estimate the
private benefits from control in Sweden and concludes that they are small. However, Cronqvist and Nilsson
(2002) reach a somewhat different conclusion as they show that Tobin’s q fall significantly as the agency
costs of controlling shareholders increase. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between cash flow rights and
voting rights of the controlling shareholder block. A one share – one vote system means that the company
law requires that ordinary shares carry one vote per share. In Sweden, many firms have dual-class shares;
B shares have one share – one vote, whereas A shares have higher voting shares (typically 10 votes per
share). However, there is no difference in cash flow rights for A and B shares. In our sample, 139 firms (or
64.7% of all firms) have dual class shares. Further, 71.2% of the firms with dual class shares have non-listed
high-voting shares. Finally, among the firms with non-listed shares with high voting rights, 22.3% have so
called preemptive rights. That is, the preemptive rights give owners of shares with  high voting right the
option to buy back such shares sold by a coalition member to a third party. Finally, some firms have legally
binding shareholder agreements that restrict a coalition member’s sale of listed high voting shares to a third
party and some firms have restrictions on how many shares a shareholder can vote. 
The median voting and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder coalition are 38.9% and 25.5%
of firms’ market capitalization. The corresponding numbers for all shareholder coalitions are 57.1% and
40.9%. That is, the median controlling shareholder has about 13 percentage points more of the voting rights
than of the cash flow rights. For all shareholder coalitions, the median voting right is about 16 percentage
points larger than the median cash flow rights.
There are 46 firms (about 20% of all) with a foreign owner with more than 5% of the voting rights.27
The controlling foreign ownership corresponds to 3% of total market capitalization. However, a foreign
controlling owner is in most cases a founder of the firm (or still within same the family as the founder), or
another corporation. Controlling foreign ownership by founder family or corporation accounts for 88% of
controlling foreign ownership. Hence, it is only 12% of controlling foreign ownership that is from mutual
funds or other institutional investors. Further, controlling foreign owners are often from Scandinavian
countries. In summary, we find that it is not common for foreign (or U.S.) institutional investors to own more
than 5% of the cash flow rights.
V. C. The bias in foreign portfolio shares
In Table 5, we investigate whether the determinants of foreign ownership in Sweden are consistent
with the predictions of our model. We first regress the portfolio weight of a firm in the portfolio of Swedish
shares held by foreign investors on the firm’s weight in the Swedish market portfolio. We find that the
market portfolio weight has considerable explanatory power in that regression. However, if we substitute the
float portfolio shares for the market portfolio shares, we find that the float portfolio shares explain more of
the cross-sectional variation in the portfolio shares of foreign investors in Panel A and U.S. investors in Panel
B than the market portfolio shares. We add to the regression of foreign portfolio shares on float portfolio
shares the residual from a regression of market portfolio shares on float portfolios shares. In the regression
using the portfolio shares of foreign investors, this residual has a negative coefficient that is significant for
one definition of the float and insignificant for the other definition. In the regression using the portfolio
shares of U.S. investors, this residual has a negative significant coefficient in both regressions. Finally, we
add to the regression a measure of departures from one share – one vote and a dummy variable if the firm
has a foreign listing. The foreign listing dummy variable is negative and significantly so for U.S. investors.
This is puzzling since Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2001) document a positive relation between whether
a country has ADR programs and the U.S. portfolio share of a country. Perhaps surprisingly given the results28
of Giannetti and Simonov (2002), departure from one share – one vote has no significant impact on holdings
of shares by foreign investors, but paradoxically increases holdings by U.S. investors. As a result, there is
no evidence that poorer corporate control adversely affects portfolio shares of foreign investors after
controlling for the portfolio shares in the float portfolio.
Section VI. Conclusion and additional implications. 
In this paper, we show that the home bias is intricately linked to corporate governance. When
companies are controlled by large investors, portfolio investors are limited in the fraction of a firm they can
hold. Portfolio investors cannot hold the world market portfolio in a world with controlling shareholders. We
show that the home bias is significantly smaller for the U.S. and dramatically smaller for most other countries
when one takes into account the extent to which shares are held by controlling shareholders across the world.
Since we have access to Swedish firm-level data on foreign ownership and closely-held shares, we use
Sweden to investigate the predictions of our model at the firm level. We show that the weight of a Swedish
firm in the portfolio of foreign investors is inversely related to the fraction of the firm held by controlling
shareholders.
With our results, the removal of barriers to international investment cannot make the home bias
disappear, however. For the home bias to disappear, it is necessary that investor rights improve across
countries where firms are mostly controlled by large shareholders so that it becomes optimal for firms to have
atomistic shareholders in these countries. Our regressions show that an improvement in investor protection
in a country or in a firm does not lead to a greater portfolio share of that country or firm in the portfolio of
U.S. investors keeping the share of the country or firm in the float portfolio constant. However, an
improvement in investor protection increases the share of a country or a firm in the float portfolio and
thereby increases the share of the country or firm in the portfolio of U.S. investors.29
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Countries for Year 1997
We use December 1997 prices, and splice fiscal year end prices when December 1997 prices are
unavailable. In all the firms, only 57 prices are other than December year end. The percentage of
market capitalization closely held in column (3) is computed using only firms for which ownership






























ARGENTINA 43 14 52.68% 37,764 59,252 63.73%
AUSTRALIA 279 268 24.85% 257,422 295,785 87.03%
AUSTRIA 90 42 54.85% 31,627 35,724 88.53%
BELGIUM 115 98 47.14% 133,346 136,965 97.36%
BRAZIL 149 23 67.13% 121,861 255,478 47.70%
CANADA 483 125 48.82% 156,119 567,635 27.50%
CHILE 81 75 64.94% 53,888 72,046 74.80%
CHINA 79 64 68.74% 14,941 206,366 7.24%
CZECH REP. 8 8 78.10% 4,818 12,786 37.68%
DENMARK 182 119 25.10% 85,557 93,766 91.24%
EGYPT 5 3 40.55% 1,388 20,830 6.66%
FINLAND 105 92 23.49% 72,200 73,322 98.47%
FRANCE 546 475 37.98% 558,215 674,368 82.78%
GERMANY 605 492 44.74% 811,349 825,233 98.32%
GREECE 107 23 75.18% 3,383 34,164 9.90%
HONG KONG 392 387 42.73% 373,916 413,323 90.47%
HUNGARY 26 16 49.48% 11,432 14,975 76.34%
INDIA 282 33 40.32% 26,838 128,466 20.89%
INDONESIA 130 122 68.97% 25,079 29,105 86.17%
IRELAND 57 54 13.06% 47,068 49,371 95.34%
ISRAEL 54 20 58.01% 10,092 45,268 22.29%
ITALY 194 87 37.54% 257,611 344,665 74.74%
JAPAN 2409 2392 38.38% 2,330,318 2,216,699 105.13%
JORDAN 4 2 65.55% 1,079 5,446 19.82%
KOREA, SOUTH 301 296 39.23% 35,924 41,881 85.78%
LUXEMBOURG 17 6 66.74% 11,867 33,892 35.02%
MALAYSIA 432 420 52.15% 85,255 93,608 91.08%
MEXICO 78 11 26.15% 40,240 156,595 25.70%33
MOROCCO 8 6 48.93% 4,531 12,177 37.21%
NETHERLANDS 196 158 33.74% 465,149 468,736 99.23%
NEW ZEALAND 52 51 77.48% 26,933 30,511 88.27%
NORWAY 123 112 41.07% 63,497 66,503 95.48%
PAKISTAN 95 16 77.37% 5,893 10,966 53.74%
PERU 33 6 68.60% 1,720 17,586 9.78%
PHILIPPINES 108 42 51.13% 6,315 31,361 20.13%
POLAND 41 24 64.26% 3,939 12,135 32.46%
PORTUGAL 63 48 35.04% 44,827 38,954 115.08%
SINGAPORE 219 215 57.10% 107,452 106,317 101.07%
SLOVAKIA 2 1 50.79% 222 1,826 12.18%
SOUTH AFRICA 196 182 52.86% 144,091 232,069 62.09%
SPAIN 154 113 42.12% 154,716 290,383 53.28%
SRI LANKA 12 12 19.15% 670 2,096 31.94%
SWEDEN 193 172 20.99% 259,614 272,730 95.19%
SWITZERLAND 187 140 25.73% 234,537 575,338 40.77%
TAIWAN 166 15 22.26% 31,384 287,813 10.90%
THAILAND 243 123 57.83% 7,306 23,538 31.04%
TURKEY 78 58 70.86% 22,424 61,090 36.71%
UNITED KINGDOM 1510 1474 9.93% 1,933,420 1,996,225 96.85%
UNITED STATES 484 464 7.94% 6,907,039 11,308,779 61.08%
VENEZUELA 18 2 61.53% 6,169 14,581 42.31%
ZIMBABWE 6 6 36.63% 455 1,969 23.08%34
Table 2
World market index and home bias measures
The world float portfolio is the world market portfolio adjusted to reflect that not all shares are































ARGENTINA 0.098% 0.127% 0.260% 0.157% 60.38% -0.62 -0.19
AUSTRALIA 0.237% 0.307% 1.297% 1.245% 95.99% -0.82 -0.75
AUSTRIA 0.028% 0.036% 0.157% 0.090% 57.32% -0.82 -0.60
BELGIUM 0.046% 0.060% 0.601% 0.406% 67.55% -0.92 -0.85
BRAZIL 0.239% 0.310% 1.120% 0.470% 41.96% -0.79 -0.34
CANADA 0.539% 0.699% 2.490% 1.627% 65.34% -0.78 -0.57
CHILE 0.035% 0.045% 0.316% 0.142% 44.94% -0.89 -0.68
CHINA 0.017% 0.022% 0.905% 0.361% 39.89% -0.98 -0.94
CZECH REP. 0.006% 0.008% 0.056% 0.016% 28.57% -0.89 -0.51
DENMARK 0.068% 0.088% 0.411% 0.393% 95.62% -0.83 -0.78
EGYPT 0.006% 0.008% 0.091% 0.069% 75.82% -0.93 -0.89
FINLAND 0.113% 0.147% 0.322% 0.314% 97.52% -0.65 -0.53
FRANCE 0.647% 0.839% 2.958% 2.343% 79.21% -0.78 -0.64
GERMANY 0.495% 0.642% 3.619% 2.555% 70.60% -0.86 -0.75
GREECE 0.012% 0.016% 0.150% 0.047% 31.33% -0.92 -0.67
HONG KONG 0.214% 0.278% 1.813% 1.326% 73.14% -0.88 -0.79
HUNGARY 0.027% 0.035% 0.066% 0.042% 63.64% -0.59 -0.17
INDIA 0.047% 0.061% 0.563% 0.429% 76.20% -0.92 -0.86
INDONESIA 0.019% 0.025% 0.128% 0.051% 39.84% -0.85 -0.52
IRELAND 0.107% 0.139% 0.217% 0.240% 110.60% -0.51 -0.42
ISRAEL 0.054% 0.070% 0.199% 0.106% 53.27% -0.73 -0.34
ITALY 0.316% 0.410% 1.512% 1.206% 79.76% -0.79 -0.66
JAPAN 1.038% 1.347% 9.722% 7.651% 78.70% -0.89 -0.82
JORDAN 0.000% 0.000% 0.024% 0.011% 45.83% -1.00 -1.00
KOREA, SOUTH 0.034% 0.044% 0.184% 0.143% 77.72% -0.82 -0.69
LUXEMBOURG 0.041% 0.053% 0.149% 0.063% 42.28% -0.72 -0.16
MALAYSIA 0.036% 0.047% 0.411% 0.251% 61.07% -0.91 -0.81
MEXICO 0.266% 0.345% 0.687% 0.648% 94.32% -0.61 -0.47
MOROCCO 0.002% 0.003% 0.053% 0.035% 66.04% -0.96 -0.93
NETHERLANDS 0.814% 1.056% 2.056% 1.740% 84.63% -0.60 -0.3935
NEW ZEALAND 0.040% 0.052% 0.134% 0.039% 29.10% -0.70 0.33
NORWAY 0.072% 0.093% 0.292% 0.220% 75.34% -0.75 -0.58
PAKISTAN 0.009% 0.012% 0.048% 0.014% 29.17% -0.81 -0.17
PERU 0.018% 0.023% 0.077% 0.031% 40.26% -0.77 -0.25
PHILIPPINES 0.022% 0.029% 0.138% 0.086% 62.32% -0.84 -0.67
POLAND 0.012% 0.016% 0.053% 0.024% 45.28% -0.77 -0.35
PORTUGAL 0.053% 0.069% 0.171% 0.142% 83.04% -0.69 -0.52
SINGAPORE 0.078% 0.101% 0.466% 0.256% 54.94% -0.83 -0.60
SLOVAKIA 0.000% 0.000% 0.008% 0.005% 62.50% -1.00 -1.00
SOUTH AFRICA 0.076% 0.099% 1.018% 0.612% 60.12% -0.93 -0.84
SPAIN 0.192% 0.249% 1.274% 0.942% 73.94% -0.85 -0.74
SRI LANKA 0.001% 0.001% 0.009% 0.009% 100.00% -0.89 -0.86
SWEDEN 0.295% 0.383% 1.196% 1.207% 100.92% -0.75 -0.68
SWITZERLAND 0.471% 0.611% 2.523% 2.394% 94.89% -0.81 -0.74
TAIWAN 0.038% 0.049% 1.262% 1.253% 99.29% -0.97 -0.96
THAILAND 0.016% 0.021% 0.103% 0.056% 54.37% -0.84 -0.63
TURKEY 0.046% 0.060% 0.268% 0.100% 37.31% -0.83 -0.40
UNITED KINGDOM 1.656% 2.148% 8.755% 10.072% 115.04% -0.81 -0.79
UNITED STATES 91.290% 88.701% 49.598% 58.322% 117.59% 0.84 0.52
VENEZUELA 0.015% 0.019% 0.064% 0.031% 48.44% -0.77 -0.37
ZIMBABWE 0.001% 0.001% 0.009% 0.007% 77.78% -0.89 -0.8136
Table 3: The world market portfolio, the float portfolio, and closely-held shares as predictors of a
foreign country’s share in the portfolio of stocks of U.S. investors. 
The world float portfolio is the world market portfolio adjusted to reflect that not all shares are
available for purchase by portfolio investors.  Closely-held shares is the percentage of shares in a
country which are unavailable for purchase by the portfolio investors.  Each country represents one
observation.  The table reports least square estimates and t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A: Simple regressions of the world market portfolio and the world float portfolio.





















N 5 05 05 05 0
Adjusted R
2 0.8416 0.8816 0.8792 0.8517
Panel B: Orthogonalization of world market portfolio and world float portfolio.





Weight in World Market Portfolio 0.1496
(11.36)




Weight in World Float Portfolio 0.1610
(14.11)




N5 0 5 0
Adjusted R
2 0.8792 0.879237
Table 4: The determinants of a foreign country’s share in the portfolio of stocks of US investors.
The world float portfolio is the world market portfolio adjusted to reflect that not all shares are available for purchase by portfolio investors.
US$ GNP per capita is the 1997 GNP per capita for each country measured in U.S. dollars. Anti-director rights is an index of the six
variables that measure shareholder rights in each country. The judicial efficiency index is an index that measures the efficiency of a
country's judicial system. The corruption index is a measure of a country's government corruption, and the expropriation risk index
measures the risk of expropriation. These indices are from La Porta, Lopes de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Average Openness
is the average openness from 1985 to 1995 for each country. The financial development and openness variables are from Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine (1999).  Enforcement of insider trading laws comes from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  The table reports least square
estimates and t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.38























































































































N 4 24 24 24 24 22 63 84 92 0
Adjusted R
2 0.8861 0.8854 0.8927 0.8949 0.8872 0.8943 0.8840 0.8920 0.900939
Table 5. U.S. and Foreign Investors’ Holdings of Shares in Swedish Firms
The table shows the results from regressions of the weight in portfolio of stocks of foreign and U.S. investors on market capitalization
weights, weights based float portfolios, and other firm-specific variables. In Panel A the dependent variable is the weight in portfolio of
stocks of foreign investors. In Panel B the dependent variable is the weight in portfolio of stocks of U.S. investors. Float I Weights refers
to the market capitalization weights adjusted for closely held shares by the largest shareholder coalition (the narrow measure of closely
held shares). Float II Weights refers to the market capitalization weights adjusted for all closely held shares (the broad measure of closely
held shares). All weights are expressed in %. The Orthogonal Market Capitalization Weights variable refers to the residuals from a
regression of Market Capitalization Weights on Float I Weights or Float II Weights (that is, the variable captures the explanatory power
of market capitalization weights beyond the float weights). Foreign Listing is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed on a
foreign exchange, and zero otherwise. Wedge I is the voting rights minus cash flow rights for the largest shareholder coalition. Wedge II
is the voting rights minus cash flow rights for all shareholder coalitions. There are 228 cross-sectional observations. The table reports least
square estimates and t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.40
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Foreign Portfolio Weights





















































Adjusted R-square 0.9230 0.9513 0.9567 0.9568 0.9605 0.9275 0.9540 0.958441
Panel B. Dependent Variable: U.S. Portfolio Weights





















































Adjusted R-square 0.8587 0.9030 0.9210 0.9275 0.9534 0.8737 0.9141 0.9316